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Comment
The Wrong Answer to a Serious Problem: A Story of
School Shootings, Politics and Automatic Transfer
I.

INTRODUCTION

A recent string of school shootings has captured the attention of
America.' The epidemic began in Pearl, Mississippi, when a sixteenyear-old boy walked into his high school, approached his ex-girlfriend,
pulled out a rifle, and began shooting. 2 He killed two students,
including his ex-girlfriend, and wounded seven others. 3 In West
Paducah, Kentucky, a fourteen-year-old's assault on an early morning
prayer circle in a high school lobby left three dead and five wounded. 4
In Jonesboro, Arkansas, an eleven-year-old and a thirteen-year-old boy
pulled a fire alarm and shot at those exiting the building, taking the lives
of four students and one teacher. 5 In Springfield, Oregon, a freshman
boy calmly walked into the school's cafeteria and killed two of his
classmates, wounding nineteen others. 6 Most shockingly, two seniors at
1. See Bob Greene, Storms Whose Paths No One Can Track, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 1999, § 5,
at 1.
2. See Teen Accused of Killing 2, Wounding 7 at High School, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 2, 1997, § 1, at

5 [hereinafter Teen Accused of Killing 2]. The gunman stabbed his mother to death before going
to Pearl High School and opening fire. See id. He was tried and convicted of murder as an adult
and is currently serving three life sentences. See Teen Found Guilty of Killing 2 Classmates in
Rampage, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 1998, § 1, at 3 [hereinafter Teen FoundGuilty of Killing 2].
3. See Teen Accused of Killing 2, supra note 2, at 5; Teen Found Guilty of Killing 2, supra

note 2, at 3.
4. See 2 Slain, 6 Wounded at High School: Teen Calmly Opens Fire on Students in Kentucky,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 2, 1997, § 1, at 3. The gunman was charged with three counts of murder and six
other counts related to the shooting at West Paducah High School. See 25 Years Without Parole
for Teen Who Killed 3 at School, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 1998, § 1, at 5. He was tried and sentenced

as an adult to life in prison. See id. He will be eligible for parole in 2023. See id.
5. See Julie Deardorff, 4 Pupils, Teacher Die in Schoolyard Ambush, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 25,

1998, § 1, at 1. The two shooters were tried as juveniles and sentenced to a state juvenile home
for committing the shootings at Westside Middle School. See Julie Deardorff, 2 Young
Jonesboro Killers Confined to Juvenile Center, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 12, 1998, § 1, at 1. They will be

released on their 21st birthdays. See id.
6. See Robert Kaiser & V. Dion Haynes, Teenager Opens Fire in Oregon High School: Police

Find ParentsDead at Boy's Home After Spree, CHI. TRIB., May 22, 1998, § 1, at 1. The gunman
killed both his parents before entering Thurston High School with three guns and opening fire.
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Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, conducted an intricately
planned massacre, which resulted in the deaths of twelve students, one
teacher, and the two gunmen, and injuries to over twenty other
students. 7 The American public reacted to these incidents with
disbelief, outrage, and calls for the severe punishment of future violent
school offenders.
Responding to these demands, legislatures across the nation proposed
new laws intended to prevent school violence by creating harsher
punishments for future offenders. 8 On June 4, 1999, less than six weeks
after the Littleton tragedy, Illinois Governor George Ryan targeted these
concerns by signing legislation amending the Juvenile Court Act
("Act"). 9 The Act dictates the legal treatment of Illinois' delinquent
minors. 10 The bill amended the jurisdictional section of the Act to
permit the criminal prosecution of fifteen-year-olds charged with
aggravated battery with a firearm in a school setting. 1'1 The new law
removes juveniles charged with this crime from the jurisdiction of

See Oregon Teen Admits Murdering 4; Killer of Students, Dad, Mom Could Earn Parole, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 25, 1999, § 1, at 8. He recently pled guilty to four counts of murder and awaits sentencing. See id.
7. See Judith Graham et al., Massacre Shatters School -"A Suicide Mission": 2 Gunmen in
Black Leave Possibly 25 Dead, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 21, 1999, § 1, at 1 [hereinafter Graham et al.,
MassacreShatters School]. The massacre at Columbine High School captivated the nation. See
Greene, supra note 1, at 1. The two seniors, armed with several weapons each, including an illegal automatic pistol and dozens of homemade explosives, walked from room to room as they shot
their classmates. See Judith Graham et al., Police Find Arsenal in Devastated School: Guns,
Bombs and Bodies Strewn Through Library, Hallways, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 22, 1999, § 1, at 1
[hereinafter Graham et al., Police Find Arsenal in Devastated School]. Both committed suicide
before the police could apprehend them. See id.
8. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-501 (Michie 1999) (introducing the notion of "blended
sentencing" in Arkansas, which allows a judge to impose a criminal sentence on a juvenile that
will take effect if the terms of a juvenile sentence are violated); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 493 §
1-18 (Michie Supp. 1998) (passing a "Safe Schools Act," which allocated funding for violence
prevention programs); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (1998) (making murder on educational property a capital offense); see also Richard Wolf, States Act After School Shootings: Some Focus on
Prevention; Others Pass Get-Tough Laws, USA TODAY, May 4, 1999, at 3A (describing legislation passed by Arkansas, Kentucky, and Mississippi in response to high-profile school shootings
in those states and discussing proposed legislation in Oregon); infra Part Il.B (discussing blended
sentencing).
9. See Act of June 4, 1999, Pub. Act No. 91-15, sec. 5, § 405/5-130(a), 1999 Ill. Legis. Serv.
125, 126 (West) (to be codified at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130(a)); see also Lisa Black, New
Laws Target School Violence: Ryan Signs Bills To Increase Security, CHI. TRIB., June 5, 1999, §
1, at 6.
10. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-101 to 5-915 (West 1999). Under the Act, juveniles are tried in Juvenile Court, where a determination is made whether or not a child is a delinquent minor. See id. These proceedings are not criminal in nature but are designed to serve a
rehabilitative function. See id.
11. See Act of June 4, 1999, § 405/5-130(a).
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juvenile court by means of an automatic transfer provision. 12 Under an
automatic transfer provision, transferred minors appear in criminal court
based solely on the offense with which they are charged and their age at
the time of the offense.' 3 The current legislation, passed with the intent
to prevent further school shootings, 14 adds the crime of aggravated
battery with a firearm to the other transfer crimes, which include
15
murder, deviant sexual assault and armed robbery.
This Comment will chronicle the history of transfer laws in Illinois in
light of the goals established by the Illinois Juvenile Court,' 6 as well as
recent amendments to the Juvenile Court Act that do not involve
transfer provisions. 17 Further, this Comment will describe recent
studies that analyze the inefficacy of automatic transfer laws, including
the new Illinois legislation. 18 This Comment will next discuss the
reasoning behind the passage of this particular amendment, 19 and it will
analyze the soundness of these reasons.20 Finally, this Comment will
argue that the legislature should repeal the amendment in favor2 1of the
recent and already existing amendments to the Juvenile Court Act.

12. See id. There are four types of transfer provisions discussed in this Comment. The first is
discretionary transfer or judicial waiver (hereinafter "judicial transfer"), which allows a juvenile
court judge to transfer cases to criminal court on a case-by-case basis. See Act of June 4, 1999,
Pub. Act No. 91-15, sec. 5, § 405/5-805(3), 1999 Ill. Legis. Serv. 125, 131 (West) (to be codified
at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(3)). The second is automatic transfer, also referred to as
mandatory transfer or legislative transfer (hereinafter "automatic transfer"), which provides
guidelines for transfer by statute, based on the age of the accused and the crime charged. See id.
§ 405/5-805(2). The current Illinois legislation, which is the focus of this Comment, is an automatic transfer statute. See id. § 405/5-130. The third is presumptive transfer, which shifts the
burden of proof to the accused juvenile to avoid being tried in criminal court. See id. § 405/5805(2). The fourth type of transfer is prosecutorial transfer method, or direct-file (hereinafter
"direct-file"). See Lisa A. Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitatingthe Juvenile Court System: Limiting
Juvenile Transfers to Adult Criminal Court, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1254, 1269 (1996). Illinois has
no provision for direct-file transfer. See id. at 1270 n.1 15. This gives the prosecutor unchecked
discretion as to whether to try the accused child as a juvenile or an adult. See id. at 1269.
13. See Act of June 4, 1999, § 405/5-130(a).
14. See S.B. 759, 44th Legis. Day 4-5 (Il. 1999) (comments of Rep. Parke); see also infra
Part III.B (discussing the role of the Columbine High School massacre in the passage of the recent legislation).
15. See Act of June 4, 1999 § 405/5-805, 1999 11. Legis. Serv, 125, 130 (West) (to be codified
at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805) (detailing the types of transfer offenses); id. § 405/5-130
(listing the offenses that result in automatic transfer).
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See infra Parts II.A-B.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Parts IV-V.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
II.

[Vol. 31

BACKGROUND

The question of whether a child should be tried in juvenile court or

criminal court has been a century-long dilemma in Illinois.2 2 Automatic
transfer provisions are one means by which juvenile offenders have
been tried as adults. 23 While the recent Juvenile Justice Reform Act of
1998 ("JJRA") has provided other alternatives, 24 and empirical studies
have suggested their general inefficacies, 25 automatic transfer provisions

continue to predominate.
A. History of Transfer Laws in Illinois
A group of social reformers that included politicians, lawyers, and
social workers founded the Illinois Juvenile Court over one hundred
years ago. 26 This group advocated for a separate court system for
juveniles, arguing that the legal system should treat children differently
than adults. 27 The legislature passed the first Juvenile Court Act to
reflect this goal in 1899.28 Before the establishment of the first Juvenile
29
Court, children regularly faced the harsh conditions of adult prisons.
22. See infra Part H.A.
23. See infra Part l.A.1-3.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See infra Part H.C.
26. See Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Il. Laws 131 (codified as amended at 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1 (West 1999)). The Act provided:
Or if the child is found guilty of any criminal offense and the judge is of the opinion
that the best interest requires it, the court may commit the child to any institution
within said county incorporated under the laws of this State for the care of delinquent
children .... In no case shall a child be committed beyond his or her minority.
Id. at 134; see also David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer Out of the Juvenile Court, in
THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL
COURT 1, 7-8 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds.) (forthcoming 2000) (citing STEVEN L.
SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
"PROGRESSIVE" JUVENILE JUSTICE 49-54 (1977)).
27. See Tanenhaus, supra note 26, at 8-10.
28. See Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 131.
29. See Steven A. Drizin, Net of "Automatic Transfer" Growing Too Wide, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Apr. 24, 1999, at 1. One of the founders of the Illinois Juvenile Court, Mrs. Lucy L.
Flower, related "many pitiful cases of little children confined in the police stations or the jails and
of one boy, in the former place, who had been bitten by rats." See Mrs. Joseph T. Bowen, The
Early Days of the Juvenile Court, in THE CHILD THE LAW AND THE COURT (New Republic
1925), reprinted in The First Juvenile Court in Chicago (Cook County), Illinois, 1899-1900, in
JUVENILE OFFENDERS FOR A THOUSAND YEARS 450 (Wiley B. Sanders ed., 1970). Conditions in
North Carolina prisons from 1869-1899 were similarly troubling:
As a general thing our jails are miserably constructed, and there is little or no attention
paid to the division and classification of prisoners. Every offender, or even one accused of crime-the boy of twelve, put in for a street fight, or some slight misdemeanor, and the hardened criminal, deep dyed in infamy, are all thrown together in
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The Act changed the punitive focus of the legal system regarding
juveniles and stressed the goal of rehabilitation. 30 For various reasons,
however, Juvenile Court judges and legislators perceived that the court
was ill-suited to hear some juvenile cases. 31 Consequently, both the
Juvenile Court and the Illinois General Assembly created provisions
that transferred jurisdiction
over the delinquent minor to the criminal
32
court in certain situations.
The history of Illinois transfer provisions can be divided into three
phases. 33 The first phase illustrates the early history of transfer and the
motivations behind it. 4 This phase begins with the founding of the
Illinois Juvenile Court in 1899 and ends in 1966 with the United States
Supreme Court's landmark decision on judicial waiver in Kent v. United
States.35 The second phase reflects the change in the state's preference
from judicial waiver to automatic transfer. 36 This phase begins with the

filth and idleness, thereby making the jail a seminary of crime and corruption.
FirstAnnual Report of the Board of Public Charities of North Carolina, Feb. 1870 (Raleigh,
1870), reprinted in Delinquent Children in North Carolina,1869-1899, in JUVENILE OFFENDERS
FOR A THOUSAND YEARS 410 (Wiley B. Sanders ed., 1970) [hereinafter "FirstAnnual Report"].
30. See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909). Mack was
one of the first Juvenile Court judges in Cook County. See id. He stated that in delinquency proceedings, a judge should act "as a wise and merciful father handles his own child whose errors are
not discovered by the authorities." Id. Mack stressed that the focus was not to be on the offense
committed, but that the judge was to concern himself with the juvenile himself or herself, "physically, mentally, (and) morally." See id; see also Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 I11.
Laws 137
(codified as amended at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1 (West 1999)). This portion of the Act
states:
This act shall be liberally construed to the end that its purpose may be carried out, to
wit: That the care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate as nearly as may
be that which should be given by its parents, and in all cases where it can properly be
done, the child be placed in an improved family home and become a member of the
family by legal adoption or otherwise.
1899 Ill.
Laws. 131, 137. Alternatively, the current version of the Act instructs judges:
[T]o secure for each minor subject hereto such care and guidance, preferably in his or
her own home, as will serve the safety and moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community; to preserve and strengthen
the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him or her from the custody of his
or her parents only when his or her safety or welfare or the protection of the public
cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal.
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-2.
31. See infra Parts II.A.1-3 (illustrating various reasons the Juvenile Court was unfit for deciding certain juvenile cases).
32. See infra Parts II.A.1-3 (explaining the development of transfer provisions).
33. See supra note 12 (describing the different types of transfer provisions in Illinois).
34. See infra Part Il.A.1 (describing the early history of transfer and the reasoning behind it).
35. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
36. See infra Part II.A.2 (illustrating how judicial waiver allows the Juvenile Court judge to
exercise discretion on whether or not the accused juvenile will be transferred to criminal court,
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Kent decision and continues until the passage of the first Illinois
automatic transfer law in 1982. 37 Finally, the third phase chronicles the

rapid growth of Illinois' automatic transfer laws 38from 1982 to the
present and the judicial challenges to these provisions.

1. Growing Pains: 1899-1966
An overload of children in the Juvenile Court system during the first
few years of its existence led to a controversy over who belonged in
Juvenile Court versus who belonged in criminal court. 39 State
prosecutors and Juvenile Court judges disagreed over the extent of the
Juvenile Court's jurisdiction. 4° While the Act dictated that Juvenile
Court judges had original and exclusive jurisdiction over all juvenile
offenders, state prosecutors insisted on trying serious juvenile offenses,
such as armed robbery, in criminal court. 41 Due to this conflict, the
Illinois Juvenile Court often failed to exercise its broad right of original
and exclusive jurisdiction 42 over children under the age of seventeen in

while automatic transfer provisions send a juvenile to criminal court based solely on their age and
the alleged crime committed).
37. See infra Part Il.A.2 (describing the effect of the Kent decision and the passage of the first
automatic transfer law in Illinois).
38. See infra Part II.A.3 (analyzing the recent developments in Illinois' automatic transfer
laws and the challenges to these laws).
39. See Tanenhaus, supra note 26, at 12.
40. See Drizin, supra note 29, at 1.
41. See Tanenhaus, supra note 26, at 12-13.
42. See id. at n.17. Until 1905, Juvenile Court did not have original jurisdiction over children's cases. See id. at n.16. The presiding judge of the Juvenile Court had to meet with city officials and request transfer of children's civil and criminal cases to Juvenile Court. See id. at 13
n. 16. The 1905 amendment to the Juvenile Court Act created a broad original jurisdiction for the
Court. See 1905 Ill. Laws 83 (1905). The jurisdictional guidelines included:
[A]ny male child under the age of seventeen years or any female child under the age of
eighteen years who violates any law of this State or any city or village ordinance; or
who is incorrigible; or who knowingly associates with thieves, vicious or immoral persons; or, who, without just cause and without the consent of its parents or custodian,
absents itself from its home or place of abode, or who is growing up in idleness or
crime; or who knowingly frequents a house of ill-repute; or who knowingly frequents
any policy shop or place where any gaming device is operated; or who frequents any
saloon or dram shop where intoxicating liquors are sold; or who patronizes or visits
any public pool room or bucket shop; or wanders about the streets in the night time
without being on any lawful business or occupation; or who habitually wanders about
any railroad yards or tracks or jumps or attempts to jump onto any moving train; or
enters any car or engine without lawful authority; or who habitually uses vile, obscene,
vulgar, profane or indecent language; or who is guilty of immoral conduct in any public place or about any school house. Any child committing any of these acts herein
mentioned shall be deemed a delinquent child and shall be proceeded against as such in
the manner hereinafter provided.
Tanenhaus, supra note 26, at 12 n.17.
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cases where the child was accused of a serious crime or was on
probation.4 3
Specifically, Illinois Juvenile Court judges often

"passively" transferred controversial or significant cases to criminal
court by refusing to exercise their jurisdictional rights over the minor in
the early years of the Juvenile Court system.' When judges actively
chose to transfer a delinquent minor to criminal court, the primary
45
motive was not the harsher punishment for the alleged offender.

Rather, these judges transferred more dangerous juveniles to protect
46

other delinquent children from older and more violent offenders.
During this phase, the Juvenile Court deemed such active transfers to be
47
a rare and extreme measure.
In the years following World War II, widespread public fears of a

48
juvenile crime wave made transfer more popular and acceptable.

Legal scholars blamed this crime wave on the flawed rehabilitative
purpose of the juvenile justice system and argued that this purpose
should be replaced with more punitive measures. 49 Transfer laws
rebutted the criticism that juvenile courts were too lenient. 50 Studies
revealed that while most judges still opposed transfer, the punitive

43. See Tanenhaus, supra note 26, at 13 (citing HELEN R. JETER, THE CHICAGO JUVENILE
COURT 15 (1922)). Judges feared that if they asserted jurisdiction over serious crimes, such as
armed robbery or murder, the constitutionality of the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction would be
called into question. See id. If this happened, the judges feared that they would only be allowed
concurrent jurisdiction, which would make any child over the age of ten eligible for a criminal
trial. See id. at 13-14.
44. See id. at 15. A "passive transfer" resulted from the Juvenile Court judge's decision not to
exercise jurisdiction of a minor who, by definition, fell within the court's jurisdictional reach.
See id. By doing nothing, the judge allowed the child to be tried in criminal court. See id.
45. See Drizin, supra note 29, at 1.
46. See id. Judge William Pritchett aptly stated this philosophy in 1911 when he said:
A child, a boy especially, sometimes becomes so thoroughly vicious and is so repeatedly an offender that it would not be fair to the other children in a delinquent institution
who have not arrived at this age of depravity and delinquency to have to associate with
him. On very rare and special occasions, therefore, children are held over on a mittimus to the criminal court.
Id.
47. See Tanenhaus, supra note 26, at 19 (citing HELEN R. JETER, THE CHICAGO JUVENILE
COURT 89 (1922)). During the 1920s and 1930s, the percentage of boys transferred by Juvenile
Court judges was usually less than 1% per year. See id. Between 1915 and 1919, only 70 out of
11,799 cases were transferred. See id. All cases involved repeat offenders over the age of sixteen
or first-time offenders very near the age of seventeen. See id.
48. See id. at 29 (citing JAMES GILBERT, CYCLE OF OUTRAGE: AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE
JUVENILE DELINQUENT INTHE 1950s 1 (1986)).
49. See id.
50. See Elizabeth E. Clarke, A CaseFor Reinventing Juvenile Transfer, 47 JUV. & FAM. CT. J.
1,7(1996).
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political climate unduly influenced judges' decisions. 5 Judges made
transfer decisions based on reasons that contravened the intent of the
Juvenile Court Act. 52 In this atmosphere of heightened public anxiety
concerning the leniency of juvenile law and judicial uncertainty as to
how to apply it, the United States Supreme Court heard its first case
53
concerning juvenile rights.
2. Kent v. United States and the Guidelines of Transfer: 1966-1982
In Kent v. United States, the Supreme Court outlined the criteria for
judicial transfer, and unwittingly created an impetus for the first
automatic transfer provisions. 54 Automatic transfer provisions are
statutory mandates for the transfer of a case from juvenile court to
criminal court based solely on the age of the offender and the crime
charged. 55 Kent was the first juvenile court case to reach the Supreme
Court, and it concerned the appeal of a decision to transfer a sixteenyear-old charged with housebreaking, robbery and rape to criminal
court.5 6 The Court overturned the transfer to criminal court because the
minor had not been granted basic due process rights during his transfer
hearing. 57 Although the Court noted the important theoretical
objectives of the Juvenile Court, which included guidance and
rehabilitation, it reasoned that this did not excuse procedural
arbitrariness. 58 The Court concluded that the increased punishment
children might suffer if transferred to criminal court entitled them to
some of the procedural protections afforded to adults. 59 Although the

51. See Tanenhaus, supra note 26, at 32 (citing Transfer of Cases Between Juvenile and
Criminal Courts: A Policy Statement, 8 CRIME & DELINQ. 3-11 (1962)).
52- See id. Four of the five key factors that judges were using conflicted with the philosophy
of the Juvenile Court. See id. Judges transferred cases because of contestable facts that would
prolong the hearing, the seriousness of the offense, the hopelessness of the case and for punitive
reasons. See id. The only acceptable guideline used was the superior resources of the criminal
court in the realm of public safety. See id.
53. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
54. See id.
55. See Clarke, supra note 50, at 6.
56. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 543.
57. See id. at 546.
58. See id. at 554-55. The Juvenile Court judge did not decide the multiple motions filed by
the minor requesting a hearing in front of the judge, hospitalization for psychiatric difficulties,
and access to his Social Service file accumulated during a prior probation period. See id. at 54546. The judge held no hearing and did notconfer with the juvenile, his parents or his attorney.
See id. at 546. He issued a waiver of the minor to criminal court, but made no findings of fact,
and listed no reasons for the waiver. See id.
59. See id. at 553-54. The Court noted that a transferred juvenile could be imprisoned with
adults, and exposed to the death penalty. See id. at 554.
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Court stopped short of holding that a judicial waiver hearing must be
identical to a criminal trial, it mandated due process and fair treatment

in such proceedings.6
The Kent decision is significant for two reasons. 6 1 First, the appendix
of the decision contained a list of model guidelines for transfer, which
many states, including Illinois, adopted. 62 Second, the Court's decision
63
unintentionally spawned the first automatic transfer provisions.
Legislators passed automatic transfer provisions in direct response to
the Kent decision, reasoning that the rehabilitative ideal endorsed by
the Kent Court was flawed, and that more punitive solutions for juvenile
crime were necessary. 64 Accordingly, the Kent decision not only began
defining the constitutional rights of juveniles but also led to the passage
65
of laws that automatically treat them as adults.

60. See id. at 562. The Court ruled that Kent was entitled to a hearing, access to his juvenile
record and "a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court" judge's decision to transfer him to
criminal court. Id. at 557.
61. See Tanenhaus, supra note 26, at 34-36.
62. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 566. The guidelines included:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection
of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated
or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight
being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon which a
Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment ....
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the
juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults ....
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of
his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile ....
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable
rehabilitation of the juvenile ....
Id. at 566-67; see also Act of June 4, 1999, Pub. Act. No. 91-15, sec. 5, § 405/5-805(2)(b), 1999
Il. Legis. Serv. 125, 131 (West) (to be codified at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(2)(b)) (listing
the current factors a judge must consider in making a judicial transfer decision); Drizin, supra
note 29, at 1.
63. See Tanenhaus, supra note 26, at 35-36 (citing CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE
SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 171-75 (1998)) (observing that a loss of faith in the
rehabilitative ideal of juvenile court in the 1970s, coupled with calls for stricter treatment of juvenile crime, led to the first automatic transfer statutes).
64. See id. Rising juvenile crime throughout the 1970s led to a loss of faith in the rehabilitative powers of juvenile courts. See id. Legislators responded to demands for "law and order" by
passing automatic transfer provisions, which purported to be a stricter measure than the system of
judicial waiver mandated by Kent. See id.; see also Clarke, supra note 50, at 8.
65. See Tanenhaus, supra note 26, at 35-36.
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3. The Age of Automatic Transfer: 1982-Present

In 1973, Illinois adopted the system of judicial transfer outlined in
Kent, and proponents of increased juvenile punishment quickly deemed
it inadequate. 66 In arguing for the passage of the first automatic transfer
law in 1982, critics of Kent asserted that the rehabilitative ideal
endorsed by the Kent Court was ineffective. 67 They pointed to rising
juvenile crime and the leniency of the Juvenile Court as signs that

juvenile law needed to become more focused on punishment. 68 The

1982 statute provided that juveniles age fifteen or older charged with
murder, rape, deviant sexual assault or armed robbery with a firearm
would be tried in criminal court, regardless of the individual

circumstances of their crimes. 69 Three juveniles charged under this new
law immediately challenged the constitutionality of the new provision in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Kent.70 The Illinois Supreme
Court upheld the validity of the automatic transfer provision and
despite alleged due process and separation
endorsed its constitutionality
71
violations.
powers
of
In 1985, the goal of preventing juvenile gang-related crime motivated
the passage of the next automatic transfer provision. 72 The Illinois

66. See Clarke, supra note 50, at 7-8.
67. See id. at 8.
68. See id.
69. See id. The prosecutor must only charge the juvenile with the transfer offense and allege
that he or she is older than fifteen. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130 (West 1999).
70. See People v. J.S., 469 N.E.2d 1090, 1095 (Ill. 1984). The J.S. court heard three cases
concerning juveniles whose charged offenses resulted in transfer to criminal court. See id. at
1092. J.S. and T.F. were charged with armed robbery with a firearm. See id. at 1093. L.W. was
charged with two counts of deviant sexual assault in the context of a robbery. See id. The defendants argued that they were entitled to procedural due process protection under Kent, and that a
Juvenile Court judge must give their case a full investigation before it could be transferred to
criminal court. See id. at 1095. The court found that Kent was not applicable, stating: "There is
no discretionary decision to be made by the juvenile court, and therefore we do not believe that
the holding in Kent is dispositive herein." Id. The court also rejected defendants' separation of
powers argument, holding that the automatic transfer provision redefined the statute that the legislature created and did not usurp judicial power. See id. at 1096.
71. See id.
72. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, par. 702-7(7)(a) (1985) (codified as amended at 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/5-130(2)(a) (West 1999)); see also People v. Goldstein, 562 N.E.2d 1183,
1186-87 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1990) (quoting the Senate floor debate for the automatic transfer
section of the Safe Schools Act). Senator Marovitz stated:
Senate Bill 201 is the gang crime package .... It creates the safe school zones in and
around school property and deals severely with the bringing of firearms .... the dealing of hard drugs in and around the schools. It deals with adults trying to recruit juveniles ... into gangs.
Id. at 1187 (citing 84th Illinois General Assembly, Senate Proceedings, July 1, 1985, at 40).
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legislature enacted this amendment as a part of the Safe Schools Act.
Under this legislation, juveniles over age fifteen charged with drug or
weapons violations "in or within 1,000 feet of a school" became subject
to automatic transfer. 74 The Illinois Supreme Court rejected a
constitutional challenge to this new provision 75 holding that the equal
protection and due process rights of a juvenile charged with weapons
possession on school grounds were not violated.76
The Illinois legislature added gang-related offenses to the list of
automatic transfer crimes in 1989. 77 As a result of these additions, if a
Juvenile Court judge determined that a felony or forcible felony was
related to gang activity, then the minor was automatically transferred to
criminal court.78 Overruling a lower court's determination that the
automatic transfer provision violated the separation of powers provision
of the Illinois Constitution, 79 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld this
charged
provision against a claim of unconstitutionality by a defendant
80
with multiple counts of armed violence in a gang context.

73. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, par. 702-7(7)(a) (1985) (codified as amended at 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/5-130(2)(a) (West 1999)).
74. Id.; Clarke, supra note 50, at 8.
75. See People v. M.A., 529 N.E.2d 492, 497 (Ill. 1988). The M.A. court held that the automatic transfer provision did not violate the Equal Protection Clause or defendant's due process
rights. See id. The defendant was charged with weapons possession on school grounds and transferred to criminal court. See id. at 492-93. The court held, using a rational basis test, that the
transfer law did not violate the defendant's equal protection rights. See id. at 496. The court determined that even if some inequality existed, it was overcome by the state's interest in providing
safer schools. See id. at 495. The court also dismissed the defendant's due process argument by
concluding that the legislature had acted rationally in seeking to remedy the ills of school violence. See id. at 496.
76. See id. at 497.
77. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, par. 805-4(3.1) (1989) (codified as amended at 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(1)(b) (West 1999)). Automatic transfer provision that dealt with gangrelated offenses differed slightly from other automatic transfer provisions. Specifically, the 1989
transfer provision provides that "the Juvenile Judge designated to hear and determine those motions shall, upon determining that there is probable cause that both allegations are true, enter an
order permitting prosecution under the criminal laws of Illinois." Act of June 4, 1999, Pub. Act
No. 91-15, sec. 5, § 405/5-805(1)(c), 1999 11. Legis Serv. 125, 131 (West) (to be codified at 705
ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(1)(c)).
78. See Clarke, supra note 50, at 8. In all other cases of automatic transfer, the juvenile in
question never sets foot in Juvenile Court. See id. at 8-9.
79. See People v. P.H., 582 N.E.2d 700, 703 (Ill. 1991). The P.H. court overturned a trial
court's determination that depriving the Juvenile Court of jurisdiction violated the separation of
powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. See id. at 704.
80. See id. at 703-04. The Illinois Supreme Court held that whether a minor was tried in Juvenile Court or criminal court was a matter of procedure, not jurisdiction. See id. at 706. The
defendant was charged with attempted murder, aggravated battery, aggravated battery with a firearm and armed violence. See id. at 703. The court also dismissed the defendant's claims of double jeopardy, concluding that the transfer hearing at juvenile court was not tantamount to an adju-
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Subsequently, a 1991 amendment to the "Safe Schools" transfer
provision also made drug offenses in public housing automatic transfer
offenses. 8 1 Under this amendment, juveniles age fifteen or older are
transferred to criminal court if charged with drug violations in or within
1,000 feet of property owned, operated or managed by a public housing
authority. 82 In People v. R.L., 83 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
statute's constitutionality despite the defendants' contentions of Equal
Protection Clause violations. 84 The court found the defendants'
evidence of the statute's disproportionate impact on minorities
unpersuasive. 85 The court stated that disproportionate impact alone
86
does not trigger a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The public housing transfer provision was the most recent automatic
transfer amendment passed by the legislature and upheld by the
courts. 87 In 1995, however, the General Assembly created another type
of transfer, the presumptive transfer.8 8 This transfer shifts the burden of
proof from the prosecution to the charged juvenile in certain judicial
waiver proceedings. 89 Specifically, the juvenile must present clear and
convincing evidence that he or she is amenable to the rehabilitative
functions of the Juvenile Court, or the juvenile faces transfer to criminal
court.90 Prior to the automatic transfer provision passed in 1999,
dicatory hearing. See id. at 709. The court found the defendant's argument of a violation of
equal protection equally unpersuasive in applying the rational basis test. See id. at 709-11.
Similarly, the court found contentions of substantive and procedural due process violations unpersuasive, holding that the transfer provision fell within the powers of the legislature, and that
the Kent decision did not apply. See id. at 711-13.
81. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, par. 805-4(7)(a) (1991) (codified as amended at 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/5-130(2)(a) (West 1999)).
82. See id.
83. People v. R.L., 634 N.E.2d 733 (1I1. 1994).
84. See id. at 739. The court held that the provision passed the rational basis test of equal
protection because it was rationally related to a state goal, namely, deterring narcotics trafficking
in housing projects. See id.
85. See id. at 737. The two minor defendants in R.L. were charged with drug offenses, including delivery and possession with intent to deliver. See id. at 735.
86. See id. at 737.
87. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, par. 805-4(7)(a) (1991) (codified as amended at 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/5-130(2)(a) (West 1999)); see also Clarke, supra note 50, at 8-9.
88. See Act of June 4, 1999, Pub. Act No. 91-15, § 405/5-805(2), 1999 I11.Legis. Serv. 125,
131 (West) (to be codified at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(2)).
89. See id. The offenses include all Class X felonies other than armed violence, aggravated
discharge of a firearm, and various types of armed violence with a firearm. See id. If the petition
filed by the prosecutor alleges any of these weapons violations and can demonstrate probable
cause, presumptive transfer takes effect. See id.; see also supra note 12 (explaining presumptive
transfer).
90. See Act of June 4, 1999, § 405/5-805(2)(b)(i-ix). The legislature instructed the judge to
follow a list of factors in making this decision, which include:
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presumptive transfer applied to aggravated battery with a firearm.
Overall, the rapid expansion of automatic transfer provisions from
1982 to 1995 led to a large increase in the number of juveniles
transferred to criminal court.9 2 In Cook County, for example, almost all
minors are now transferred by means of automatic transfer provisions
rather than by other statutory means of transfer. 93 Furthermore, the
number of automatic transfers has increased each year. For example;
automatic transfers increased from 904 transfers in 1993 to 2,775
transfers in 1994. 94 Finally, the largest percentage of the transferees
have been charged with non-violent crimes. 95 Given this evidence,
some Juvenile Court judges believed that the provisions
went too far
96
and that other alternatives might be more desirable.

(i) The seriousness of the alleged offense;
(ii) The minor's history of delinquency;
(iii) The age of the minor;
(iv) The culpability of the minor in committing the alleged offense;
(v) Whether the offense was committed in an aggressive or premeditated manner;
(vi) Whether the minor used or possessed a deadly weapon when committing the alleged offense;
(vii) The minor's history of services, including the minor's willingness to participate
meaningfully in available services;
(viii) Whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the minor can be rehabilitated before the expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction;
(ix) The adequacy of the punishment or services available in the juvenile justice system.
Id. The court gives greater weight to an accused minor's previous criminal record, if any, and the
seriousness of the alleged offense, than any of the other listed factors. See id.
91. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-4 (West 1996) (repealed 1999). In March of 1998, there
were 74 cases in which juveniles were alleged to have committed aggravated battery with a firearm. See Mike McInerney, Delinquency Division, Cook County Office of the Public Defender,
Transfer Facts (Mar. 3, 1999) (unpublished materials, on file with author). Of the 74 alleged offenses, prosecutors filed 37 petitions to have matters transferred to criminal court by judicial
waiver. See id. Eleven cases were transferred, five were denied transfer, 14 remained pending
and seven petitions were withdrawn or nolled. See id. Overall, 15% (11/74) were transferred to
criminal court, and in 57% of the cases (42/74), proof was not sufficient to support a petition for
transfer to adult court. See id.
92. See Clarke, supra note 50, at 5.
93. See id. Clarke reports that 93% (842/904) of the 1993 transfers in Illinois were automatic
and 88.3% (799/904) of these transfers were from Cook County. See id. Ninety-eight percent
(2,717/2,775) of the transfers in 1994 were automatic transfers. See id.
94. See id. From 1985 to 1992, a total of 2,451 Cook County juveniles were transferred. See
id.
95. See Drizin, supra note 29, at 1.
96. See Clarke, supra note 50, at 5. An informal survey at a 1996 conference of Juvenile
Court judges indicated that the delegates thought automatic transfer had gone far enough. See id.
One committee member, noting the increase in juvenile transfer coupled with no increase in deterrent effect, recommended other legislative alternatives to automatic transfer. See id.
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B. A DepartureFrom Transfer: The Juvenile Justice
Reform Act of 1998
In 1998, the Illinois legislature responded to criticism concerning
various sections of the Act, including automatic transfer provisions, by
enacting the most comprehensive set of reforms in Juvenile Court
history. 97 The many amendments, entitled "The Juvenile Justice
Reform Act" ("JJRA"), adopted a new philosophy of balanced and
restorative justice concerning juvenile offenders and did not include
automatic transfer provisions. 98 The JJRA purports to give attention to
three different interests: the accused juvenile's needs, the victim's rights
and needs, and the community's safety. 99 This change in philosophy
emerged in response to both the questionable effectiveness of the
current system and the emergence of recurring headline-making juvenile
crime. 100
The JJRA introduced the central concept of extended jurisdiction
juvenile prosecutions ("EJJP").1 ' EJJP allows a Juvenile Court judge
to impose a "blended sentence" on minors age thirteen or older charged

97. See Juvenile Justice Reform Provisions of 1998, Pub. Act No. 90-590, Ill. Legis. Serv.
1289 (West); Michele M. Jochner, An Overview of the Juvenile Justice Reform Provisions of
1998, 87 ILL. B.J. 152, 152 (1999).
98. See Daniel Dighton, Balanced and Restorative Justice in Illinois, THE COMPILER, Winter
1999, at 4, 4-5. The balanced and restorative justice ("BARFJ) model consists of two concepts.
See Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, Panel Q & A on Juvenile Justice Reform,
THE COMPILER, Winter 1999, at 1, 9. "Restorative justice" stresses a juvenile offender's responsibilities in restoring his or her community to its state before the offense was committed. See id.
The "balanced justice" aspect of the BARJ model requires the juvenile justice system to give
equal attention to three goals: public safety, juvenile accountability, and juvenile rehabilitation.
See id. The principle architect of the JJRA stated that the BARJ model was superior to previous
systems that exclusively emphasized rehabilitation or punishment. See id. Catherine Ryan, Chief
of the Juvenile Justice Bureau, Cook County State's Attorney's Office, stated: "We must change
our thinking and modes of working from an offender-focused system to one in which we work in
active partnership with the community to achieve the goals of public safety and offender accountability, while developing the competency of the juvenile." Id.
99. See Dighton, supra note 98, at 4.
100. See Christi Parsons, Tougher Sentencing for Youths Awaits Edgar OK, CHI. TRIB., Feb.
4, 1998, § 1, at 10. The high-profile deaths of Chicago-area children Robert "Yummy" Sandifer
and Eric Morse spurred, in part, the JJRA. See id. Sandifer, an eleven-year-old gang member,
was executed by members of his own gang in apparent retaliation for his murder of a neighborhood girl. See id. Morse, a five-year-old, was dropped to his death from the 14th floor of a
housing project by a ten-year-old and an eleven-year-old for refusing to steal candy. See id.
101. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810 (West 1998); Jochner, supra note 97, at 158. In
addition to EJJP, the Act also mandated creation of juvenile justice counsels, local groups which
will advise county boards on the status of juvenile delinquency prevention programs. See Dighton, supra note 98, at 15. It also created a more detailed records system for juvenile offenders
and placed a limit on station adjustments (non-judicial sanctions dispensed by police officers).
See id.
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with offenses that do not evoke the automatic transfer provisions of the
Juvenile Court Act.' 0 2 If the minor successfully completes the juvenile
sentence, the adult sentence will never come into effect. 10 3 If the minor
violates the terms of the juvenile sentence, however, the court will
10 4
impose an adult sentence upon a preponderance of the evidence.
Several states passed laws promulgating blended sentencing, and at
least one state, Arkansas, did so in response to the recent high-profile
school shootings. 1 5 Illinois legislators hoped the JJRA would not only
stem the flow of current violent juvenile crime while guaranteeing
adequate criminal sanctions but also act as an opportunity for juvenile
06

rehabilitation. 1

102. See § 405/5-810. The drafters of the JJRA wanted aggravated battery with a firearm to
become an automatic transfer crime as a result of the legislation, but they abandoned this notion.
See James R. Covington III, Legislative Activity in Juvenile Justice, JUv. JUST. (Ill. State Bar
Ass'n., Chicago, IL.), Oct. 1996, at 7-8 (indicating that the Illinois State's Attorneys Association
recommended the addition of aggravated battery with a firearm to the list of automatic transfer
crimes and recommended the creation of EJJP).
103. See § 405/5-810.
104. See id.
105. See Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction Act, Pub. Act No. 1192, 1999 Ark. Adv. Legis. Serv.
1740 (Lexis) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-501 to -510 (Lexis 1999)). Arkansas passed
the Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction Act ("EJJA") in the wake of the Jonesboro school shootings,
in which an eleven-year-old and a thirteen-year-old killed four fellow middle school students and
a teacher. See David Firestone, Despite Anger at Killings, State Carefully Crafts Law, THE
OREGONIAN, Apr. 11, 1999, at A4. Recognizing that many stringent juvenile crime laws are
passed in response to highly publicized crimes, state leaders consulted prosecutors, defense attorneys and child development specialists while drafting the EJJA. See id. The EJJA allows prosecution of a child of any age for murder, but only if the prosecutor can indicate that the child has
the necessary mental state for the crime alleged, appreciates the criminal nature of his or her conduct, and could conform his or her conduct to the law. See Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction Act,
Pub. Act No. 1192. Judges are also allowed to use blended sentencing, like the JJRA in Illinois.
See id.; 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810 (West 1998). A public defender who consulted on the
EJJA revealed the intent of the Arkansas legislature: "'the Legislature agreed that you can't
change the entire criminal justice system just to fit a certain set of facts, no matter how bad they
happened to be."' Firestone, supra, at A4.
106. See Dighton, supra note 98, at 4 (discussing the goals of the JJRA in light of the BARJ
system). But see Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, supra note 98, at 13. Although
high expectations surrounded the passage of EJJP, critics speculated that it would not be utilized
often enough to make a difference. See id. Dallas Ingemunson, Chairman of the Illinois Juvenile
Justice Commission, stated that "[EJJP]" is a very smart approach for serious juvenile offenders.
The imposition of both juvenile and criminal sanctions allows the young person a last opportunity
to be treated by the juvenile system, but holds him or her very responsible for taking advantage of
that opportunity." Id. Catherine Ryan, Chief of the Juvenile Justice Bureau, Cook County State's
Attorney's Office, and principle architect of the JJRA, remarked that "[tihere is a small universe
of serious crimes and juvenile offenders where [EJJP] prosecutions will be best utilized. This
fact, coupled with the resource demands of the juvenile's right to request a jury trial, will cause
many state's attorneys not to use [EJJP] prosecutions very often." Id.
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C. EmpiricalStudies on the Efficacy of Automatic Transfer Laws
Empirical studies evaluating the effectiveness of automatic transfer
provisions support Illinois' temporary shift away from these laws in the
JJRA.'0 7 Numerous studies have evaluated the effectiveness of transfer
provisions. 108 Although most older studies focused on judicial waiver,
current studies devote their attention to the inefficacy of automatic
transfer provisions. 10 9 These studies describe general characteristics of
juvenile crimes frequently transferred, such as crimes committed in
groups."l 0 This research also shows that the goals of legislatures,
namely deterrence and reduced juvenile crime, are not fulfilled by
passing transfer laws."' Furthermore, experts attempted to determine
the impact of the statutes on minorities, especially those residing in
urban areas, but have reached varying conclusions."12 Finally, experts
analyzed recidivism in transferred minors as compared to their nontransferred counterparts and found no benefit to transfer provisions. 113
1. General Characteristics: Group Crime
Illinois prosecutors transfer many groups of minors accused of
committing the same crime to criminal court by charging them all with
the same offense.' 14 By using the accountability provisions of the
Criminal Code, prosecutors are able to relegate the entire group to
criminal court, regardless of how little one group member may have
been involved."l 5 Research indicates that prosecutors may misapply
107. See infra Parts II.C. 1-4 (discussing empirical studies of automatic transfer provisions);
see also supra Part HI.B (describing the JJRA).
108. See JAMES C. HOWELL, JUVENILE JUSTICE & YOUTH VIOLENCE 90-111 (1997) (summarizing studies done on transfer provisions, including judicial waiver, automatic transfer, and direct-file transfer); David L. Myers, Excluding Violent Youths from Juvenile Court: The Effectiveness of Legislative Waiver (visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapterl
_l.htn> (summarizing previous transfer research).
109. See HOWELL, supra note 108, at 99-100 (summarizing the studies on transfer provisions
and deterrence). As one sociologist put it, "[tiransfer is a sociolegal policy based on very little
information." Id. at 108-09.
110. See infra Part II.C.1 (explaining that many juvenile offenders commit group crimes for
which all members of the group are charged equally).
111. See infra Part II.C.2 (describing the effect of transfer provisions on the legislative goal of
deterrence).
112. See infra Part I.C.3 (discussing the impact of transfer provisions on minority groups).
113. See infra Part ll.C.4 (outlining the effects of transfer provisions on rates of recidivism).
114. See Drizin, supra note 29, at 1.
115. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1 to -5 (West 1998). Accountability provisions allow
prosecutors to charge an alleged offender for another's crime when "[h]aving a mental state described by the statute defining the offense, he causes another to perform the conduct, and the
other person in fact or by reason of legal incapacity lacks such a mental state." Id. § 5/5-2(a).
Accountability can also be used against an alleged offender if "the statute defining the offense
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this power because a major characteristic of juvenile delinquency is the
tendency for children to commit crimes in groups.1 16 An early study
concerning juvenile offenders in Cook County revealed that groups of
offenders committed over 80% of all juvenile crime.' 17 Data from
studies involving New York City and Los Angeles juvenile offenders
corroborated the Cook County findings. 118 Accordingly, experts have
concluded that peer pressure is a large factor in juvenile group crime
and the actual amount of criminal behavior could vary from group
19
member to group member."
2.

Deterrence

Besides analyzing general trends in juvenile crime, researchers
focused on the specific goals behind the passage of transfer laws and
whether the laws met those goals. 120 Deterrence is a primary reason
behind the passage of automatic transfer provisions, yet several studies
found little empirical support for this rationale. 121 One study focused on
a New York transfer law, which lowered the age of automatic transfer
for murder to thirteen and other violent offenses to fourteen. 122 A tenyear comparison of juvenile arrest rates in New York and Philadelphia

makes him so accountable," or "[ejither before or during the commission of an offense, and with
the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to
aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense." Id. § 5/5-2(b)-(c); see also
Drizin, supra note 29, at 1 (describing the effects of accountability provisions on a hypothetical
carload of accused juvenile offenders).
116. See Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some Implications of a Well-Known
Secret, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 867 (1981).
117. See id. at 868. The 1931 study was based on every child who appeared as a delinquent
minor in Juvenile Court in 1928. See id.
118. See id. at 871. The 1981 New York City study found that 1,078 of 1,329 delinquent minors committed their crimes as members of a group. See id. This 81% rate compares to the Cook
County study conducted fifty years before. The individual crimes assessed in the New York City
study were gun robbery (78/87 group offenders, or 90%), other robbery (333/383, 87%), burglary
(491/571, 86%), rape (8/16, 50%), sodomy (13/17, 77%), assault (146/243, 60%) and homicide
(9/11, 78%). See id. The 1979 Los Angeles study showed that in armed robbery offenses, 82%
(85/103) of juvenile crimes were committed by multiple juvenile offenders. See id. at 872.
119. See id.; see also Drizin, supra note 29, at 1.
120. See Eric L. Jensen & Linda K. Metsger, A Test of the Deterrent Effect of Legislative
Waiver on Violent Juvenile Crime, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 96, 98 (1994).
121. See id. at 98-99; see also HOWELL, supra note 108, at 108; Myers, supra note 108, at
<http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapter1-_2.htm>.
122. See New York State Juvenile Offender Law, ch. 481, 1978 N.Y. Laws 44, 67 (codified as
amended at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 725.00-725.20 (McKinney 1995)); Simon I. Singer &
David McDowall, Criminalizing Delinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the Juvenile Offender
Law,22 L. & SOC'Y REV. 521, 522 (1988). Singer and McDowall noted that the Juvenile Offender Law of 1978 had been described as "the most punitive delinquency law in the nation," and
was enacted primarily for deterrence. Id.
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before and after the passage of the law indicated that the transfer
provision's severity did not deter juvenile offenders. 123 Homicide and
assault crimes actually increased in some areas of New York, while

decreasing in Philadelphia, demonstrating
that the automatic transfer
24

provision had no deterrent value. 1
These results from New York City, an urban environment, were
mirrored by another study that analyzed rural states. 125 The study
compared Idaho, a state with an automatic transfer provision, 126
to
provisions.
such
have
not
do
which
Wyoming,
and
Montana
Analysis of Idaho's 1981 automatic transfer statute demonstrated no
deterrent effect as measured by the incidence of violent juvenile
crime. 127 Crime in Idaho actually increased after the passage of the
1 28
amended statute as compared to crime in Montana and Wyoming.
These two studies comprised the only major inquiries into the link
129
between automatic transfer laws and overall crime rates.
Nevertheless, they triggered demands for a re-evaluation of the
130
perceived deterrent effect of automatic transfer laws.
3. Impact on Minorities
Other research focuses on the impact that transfer laws have on
different racial groups, especially urban minorities, and demonstrates
131
less agreement among researchers than in the context of deterrence.

123. See Singer & McDowall, supra note 122, at 532-33. The researchers found that homicide and assault crimes stayed the same in New York City and increased in upstate New York,
after the change in the law, while decreasing in Philadelphia. See id. at 529-30. Furthermore,
while rape and arson did decrease in New York City and State, those crimes also decreased in
Philadelphia and among older New Yorkers over the same period. See id. at 530. Robberies increased incrementally in New York, while also increasing in Philadelphia. See id. at 531. The
authors offered two explanations for their results. See id. at 532. First, the law may not have
been severe enough to create a deterrent value. See id. Given the extreme nature of the law in
question, however, the authors wondered how high the risk of punishment must be to create deterrence. See id. Second, too little time may have elapsed in order to assess the law's deterrent
value. See id. at 533. Yet, the law would have to have a very slow-rising deterrent effect to escape detection in the first six years after the law's passage. See id.
124. See id. at 529-30.
125. See Jensen & Metsger, supra note 120, at 100-02.
126. See IDAHO CODE § 16-1806A (1981) (amended and redesignated at IDAHO CODE § 20509 (1995)); Jensen & Metsger, supra note 120, at 99.
127. See Jensen & Metsger, supra note 120, at 101.
128. See id. at 101-02. The juvenile crime rates decreased 26% in Wyoming and 14% in
Montana, but increased 18% in Idaho. See id.
129. See Myers, supra note 108, at <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapterl_5.htm>.
130. See HOWELL, supra note 108, at 108-09.
131. See Myers, supra note 108, at <http://www.preventingcrime.orglr2/chapterl_4.htm> (describing the disparity in findings concerning the disproportionate impact of transfer provisions on
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Most of these studies pertain to judicial waiver and not automatic

transfer. 132 Nonetheless, examining judicial waiver studies concerning
crimes that have subsequently become automatic transfer offenses in
Illinois provides useful data for determining whether transfer provisions
evoke a disproportionate impact on minorities. 133 Overall, the research
primarily indicates that transfer provisions disproportionately affected
African-Americans, particularly those who reside in urban areas.

Additionally, it reflects that African-Americans are transferred more
often by judicial waiver and charged more134often with automatic transfer
offenses than their Caucasian counterparts.
Furthermore, some research has targeted the disparity in arrest rates
between racial groups, finding that based on the overall population,

African-Americans comprise a disproportionate number of juvenile
delinquents. 135 One study found that African-Americans make up only
15% of the juvenile population, yet account for 49% of all juvenile
violent crime arrests. 136 Another researcher confirmed this finding,
indicating that half of all juvenile arrests were of African-Americans,
37
which is at a rate five times higher than that of Caucasian juveniles. 1
Research in Illinois encompassed both judicial waiver and automatic
transfer statutes and, similar to other studies, revealed a disproportionate
impact on minorities, especially those in Cook County. 138 For example,

minorities).
132. See id.; see also supra note 12 (illustrating the difference between judicial waiver and
automatic transfer).
133. See HOWELL, supra note 108, at 108 (lamenting the lack of studies on automatic transfer,
especially since the majority of studies deal with judicial waiver, which accounts for less than
10% of transferred youth every year); see also Myers, supra note 108, at
<http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapterl_4.htm>. The Myers study demonstrates why examining judicial waiver statistics are instructive. See id. at <http://www.preventingcrime.org
/r2/chapter8_l.htm> through <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapter8_8.htm>. Myers is
able to analyze juveniles who were judicially waived, versus others who were not, before the law
was changed to an automatic transfer provision. See id. at <http://www.preventingcrime.org
/r2/press.htm>. Under current Pennsylvania law, Myers' entire sample would have been sent to
criminal court, making similar comparisons impossible. See id.
134. See Myers, supra note 108, at <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapterl_4.htm>; see
also Clarke, supra note 50, at 11-12 (summarizing Illinois transfer studies on the disproportionate
effect on minority youth).
135. See Myers, supra note 108, at <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapterl_4.htm> (describing the statistics on African-American arrest rates).
136. See HOWELL, supra note 108, at 108 (citing H.N. SNYDER & M. SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A NATIONAL REPORT 91 (1995)).
137. See Philip J. Cook & John H. Laub, The UnprecedentedEpidemic in Youth Violence, in
YOUTH VIOLENCE 27, 42-43 (Michael Tonry & Mark H. Moore eds., 1998).
138. See Clarke, supra note 50, at 11-12 (summarizing Illinois transfer studies regarding the
disproportionate effect on minority youth).
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a 1973 judicial waiver study found that although African-American
children had less serious prior criminal involvement than their

Caucasian counterparts, they were sent to criminal court at a

significantly higher rate. 139 More recently, an analysis of automatic
transfer provisions in Cook County revealed a disproportionate racial
impact. 14° The study examined minors transferred from 1992 to 1994
based on race, sex, and type of offense committed. 14 1 Of the 263
minors who were automatically transferred at that time, over 83% were
142
African-American, 11% were Latino, and 5% were Caucasian.
African-Americans comprise a minority of Cook County's population
(26.8%), and yet they have been transferred at a rate three times greater
143
than the rate of their overall presence in the population (83%).
Compare this with the percentage of Caucasians transferred in Cook
County (5%) in relation to their overall presence in the population
(67.9%). 144 Similarly, another Illinois study revealed that AfricanAmericans comprised 98% of juveniles transferred from 1991 to 1992
45
for drug and weapons possession.'
Other researchers concluded that the dramatic effects revealed in
such studies are over-exaggerated. 146 One sociologist contends that
poor methodology plagued the 1973 Illinois study and that empirical
literature on race in general remains inconclusive. 147 Another study
found that although minorities were disproportionately eligible for
judicial transfer, the judge actually transferred a larger percentage of

139. See Robert B. Keiter, Criminalor Delinquent? A Study of Juvenile Cases Transferredto
the Criminal Court, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 528, 531 (1973). Fifty-nine of the 64 transfers (92%)
in Cook County during 1970 were of African-American children. See id. Keiter noted that while
the only two Caucasians were transferred on murder charges, the African-American children were
mostly transferred for gang affiliation. See id.
140. See Clarke, supra note 50, at 13.
141. See id. at 12-13.
142. See id. at 13. Clarke cautions about the reliability of the results because several children
with Hispanic surnames were listed as Caucasian. See id.
143. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Population Estimates for Counties by Race and Hispanic
Origin: July 1, 1998 (last modified Sept. 15, 1999) <www.census.gov/population
/estimates/countycrhcrhil.txt>.
144. See Clarke, supra note 50, at 13 (listing the percentage of Caucasian children transferred
in a recent study).
145. See HOWELL, supra note 108, at 100 (citing ELIZABETH E. CLARKE, TREATMENT OF
JUVENILES AS ADULTS: A REPORT ON TRENDS IN AUTOMATIC TRANSFER TO CRIMINAL COURT
IN COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS (1994)).
146. See Jeffrey Fagan et al., Racial Determinants of the Judicial Transfer Decision: Prosecuting Violent Youth in Criminal Court, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 259, 276 (1987); Marcy R. Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver, 86 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 449,481 (1996).
147. See Fagan et al., supra note 146, at 266.
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Caucasians. 14 8 That study also concluded that, while minorities were
149
disproportionately impacted by transfer, it was only an indirect effect.
This study, however, only examined judicial waiver. 150 If, instead, an
automatic transfer provision applied to the offense, every charged
offender would be subject to transfer, and minorities would be
disproportionately impacted through the sheer number of charged
minority juveniles. 15'
In addition to the studies reflecting the disproportionate effect of
automatic transfer laws on minority youth, another study focused
primarily on the adverse effect of Illinois automatic transfer provisions
on urban minorities. 152 This study examined the effects of the 1985
law, which made drug or weapons violations within 1,000 feet of a
school an automatic transfer offense. 153 The researcher concluded that
the transfer law's creation of a 1,000 foot "safe school zone" resulted in
excessive criminal penalization of Chicago minorities.' 54 When the
1,000 foot zones were extended around each Chicago school, over 82%
of the city fell into "safe school zones."' 155 Critics of automatic transfer
have indicated that because urban minorities are significantly more
likely to be transferred than their Caucasian
suburban counterparts,
56
automatic transfer provisions are unfair. 1
4. Recidivism
Empirical research overwhelmingly indicates that juvenile offenders
transferred to criminal court are more likely to commit another crime

148. See Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 146, at 481 n.91. While Podkopacz and Feld discovered that minorities comprised a disproportionate number of juveniles for whom transfer was requested, they had lower odds of actually being transferred than their Caucasian counterparts. See
id.
149. See id.
150. See Fagan et al., supra note 146, at 266; Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 146, at 461.
151. See supra note 12 (defining automatic transfer statutes).
152. See Denise Kane, The Walls of Samaria 18 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author); see also HOWELL, supra note 108, at 100 (citing ELIZABETH E. CLARKE, TREATMENT OF
JUVENILES AS ADULTS: A REPORT ON TRENDS IN AUTOMATIC TRANSFER TO CRIMINAL COURT
INCOOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS (1994)).
153. See Kane, supra note 152, at 4; see also 37 ILL. REV. STAT. § 702-7(6)(a) (1985) (codified as amended at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130(2)(a) (West 1999)).
154. See Kane, supra note 152, at 18.
155. See id. at 8. Kane found that the 868 Chicago public and private schools and colleges
occupied 82.79% of the land in Cook County. See id. This was compared to 252 schools occupying 16.16% of the land in DuPage County, which lies directly west of Cook County, and 101
schools occupying 4.84% of the land in Lake County, which lies directly north of Cook County.
See id.
156. See id. at 18; see also Clarke, supra note 50, at 9.
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than their non-transferred counterparts. 157 A 1994 study analyzed 557

Pennsylvania juveniles, of which 138 were transferred to criminal
court. 158 The study found that the juveniles sent to criminal court
received lengthier sentences. 159 It also found, however, that these
juveniles were released from custody sooner than their counterparts in
the juvenile detention system. 160 In all, 57% of the waived juveniles
returned to the community within four years of their release and before
they became adults. 161 Moreover, the study revealed that transferred

162
juveniles were more likely to commit another crime upon release.

While these results may merely indicate that judges were accurately
transferring the most dangerous offenders to criminal court, the study
163
remains relevant due to subsequent changes in Pennsylvania law.
Specifically, Pennsylvania's automatic transfer amendment would
remove the current fates of all 557 minors in the study from the judge's
discretion and would automatically send these minors to criminal
court. 164 The researcher concluded that if judges were accurately
transferring the most dangerous offenders to criminal court, there is no
165
reason to remove this power from them.
Other studies demonstrate support for the findings of the
Pennsylvania recidivism data. 66 A similar study analyzed recidivism in
Florida juveniles and revealed that the transferred juveniles recidivated
at a higher rate than the non-transferred juveniles. 167 A comparable
157. See Myers, supra note 108, at <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapterl5.htm>
(listing studies on recidivism of transferred juveniles as opposed to their non-transferred counterparts).
158. See id. at <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/table4.htm>.
159. See id. Myers observed that while 96% of transferred offenders were incarcerated, only
64% of non-transferred offenders did time in jail. See id. He also noted that the average time of
incarceration for transferred offenders was 3.31 years, compared to 2.45 years for non-transferred
offenders. See id.
160. See id. at <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapter8-l.htm>.
161. See id. at <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapter8-2.htm>.
162. See id. at <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapter8-3.htm>. Myers found that of the
38% of transferred offenders who recidivated, 24% committed a violent crime. See id. at
<http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/table4.htm>. Only 29% of the non-transferred offenders
recidivated, and of those, only 16% committed violent crimes. See id.
163. See id. at <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapter8_4.htm>.
164. See id. at <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapter8-l.htm>.
165. See id. at <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapter8_4.htn>.
166. See Donna M. Bishop et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Does It Make a
Difference?, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 183 (1996); Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 146, at 49091.
167. See Bishop et al., supra note 166, at 183. Thirty percent of the transferred minors were
rearrested during the year following their release. See id. at 182. Nineteen percent of the nontransferred minors recidivated over the same time period. See id.
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analysis of Minnesota juveniles yielded similar results. 168 These
conclusions indicate that transferring minors to criminal court does not
169
achieve the desired goal of deterring future juvenile crime.
Researchers have offered three possible explanations for the
phenomenon of higher recidivism among transferred juveniles. First,
the juvenile system may have better treatment facilities. 170 Second,
transferred youths who were consequently imprisoned could have
experienced a form of criminal training in adult prison. 171 Third,
transfer to criminal court could create an impression in the mind of
transferred juveniles that they are indeed criminals. 172 Each of these
factors could, in turn, lead to higher rates of recidivism. 173 In light of
the recent studies, the critics contend that the risks of higher recidivism
are not worth the rewards of longer incarceration. Accordingly, they
74
advocate a re-examination of the entire transfer system. 1

III. DISCUSSION
A. The New Transfer Provision
Despite the doubt and uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of
automatic transfer provisions, Illinois legislators introduced Senate Bill

168. See Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 146, at 490-91. Fifty-eight percent of the transferred
minors recidivated over a two-year period following their release, of which 35% committed personal felonies. See id. at 490. Forty-two percent of the non-transferred minors recidivated over
the same time period, with 37% committing personal felonies. See id.
169. See Bishop et al., supra note 166, at 183; Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 146, at 490;
Myers, supra note 108, at <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapter8-3.htm>.
170. See Myers, supra note 108, at <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapter8-3.htm>
(using current research to speculate that the adult prison system is ill-prepared to meet the needs
of juvenile offenders). Additionally, current research indicates that juveniles in adult prisons receive inferior treatment, and are more likely to be violently victimized than their adult counterparts. See id. (citing F.P. Reddington & A.D. Sapp, Juveniles in Adult Prisons: Problems and
Prospects, 20 J. CRIME & JUST. 139 (1997)).
171. See id. (noting that all juvenile justice officials interviewed for the study, with the exception of prosecutors, believed that placing juvenile offenders in the presence of adult criminals
produced adverse consequences).
172. See id. at <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapter8_4.htm> (citing recent research
on "labeling theory," which links the sentence imposed on the juvenile offender with future behavior).
173. See id. Myers notes that the imposition of a criminal sentence can lead to difficulties in
continuing an education, resuming employment or finding another job. See id.
174. See HOWELL, supra note 108, at 109-10 (citing C. Rudman et al., Violent Youth in Adult
Court: Process and Punishment, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 75 (1986)). "[W]e must ask if we are
safer from a youth who has spent one to three years in a system designed to 'treat' him, or from a
youth who has spent 10-15 years in a system designed to 'punish' him." Id.
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759 on February 24, 1999.175 The Bill proposed an amendment to the
Juvenile Court Act making aggravated battery with a firearm in and

around a school an automatic transfer offense. 176 Over a short course of
legislative debate, the Bill underwent one amendment and passed the
177
General Assembly less than ten weeks after its introduction.
Governor George Ryan signed the Bill into law in front of 600 high
school students, teachers and politicians on June 4, 1999.178
The new legislation targeted the crime of aggravated battery with a
firearm. 179 While the Criminal Code of 1961 included battery and
aggravated battery as original offenses, the Illinois legislature did not
address aggravated battery with a firearm until 1989.180 An Illinois
appellate court upheld the constitutional validity of the aggravated
battery with a firearm offense even though this new crime only required
a minor injury, which differentiated it from ordinary battery and
aggravated battery. 181 Aggravated battery with a firearm is a Class X

175. See S.B. 759, 11th Legis. Day 33 (111.1999).
176. See id. The proposal, as introduced on February 24, 1999, reads:
Amends the Juvenile Court Act of 1987. Provides for adult criminal prosecution of a
minor at least 15 years of age who is charged with aggravated battery with a firearm
committed in a school, on the real property comprising a school, within 1,000 feet of
the real property comprising a school, at a school related activity, or on or within 1,000
feet of a conveyance owned, leased or contracted by a school or school district to
transport students to or from school or a school-related activity. Provides that a juvenile judge designated to hear transfer motions must transfer for adult criminal prosecution the case of a minor at least 15 years of age charged with aggravated discharge of a
firearm committed on various school properties or on a school conveyance or within
1,000 feet of these properties or conveyances, or at a school related activity if the judge
finds probable cause that the allegations are true.
Id. Senator Kirk Dillard was the author and sponsor of the bill. See id. Senators Radogno,
Parker, Sullivan, Donahue, Nolan, W. Jones, Cronin, Geo-Karis, and Silverstein were added as
sponsors. See id.
177. See Amendment 1 to S.B. 759 (March 19, 1999) (concerning the "conveyance" part of
the bill, and replacing "or within 1,000 feet of' with "boarding or departing from"); Black, supra
note 9, at 6. Governor Ryan signed the Bill into law at Fenton High School, which one student
described as "a great publicity stunt." Id.
178. See Black, supra note 9, at 6.
179. See Act of June 4, 1999, Pub. Act No. 91-15, sec. 5, § 405/5-130, 1999 11. Legis. Serv.
125, 126 (West) (to be codified at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130). The law's effective date is
January 1, 2000. See id.
180. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par. 12-3 (1961) (codified as amended at 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/12-3) (defining battery); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par. 12-4 (1961) (codified as amended
at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-4(a-b)) (defining aggravated battery); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par.
12-4.2 (1961) (codified as amended at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-4.2(a) (West Supp.
1999) (defining aggravated battery with a firearm).
181. See People v. Tucker, 637 N.E.2d 477, 478 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1994). The Tucker
court heard a defendant's appeal from an aggravated battery with a firearm conviction. See id. at
478. The defendant argued that because aggravated battery required great bodily harm, while
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felony and is punishable by a mandatory prison term of six to thirty
82
years.'
Senate Bill 759 made aggravated battery with a firearm an automatic
transfer offense if committed
in a school, on the real property comprising a school, within 1,000 feet
of the real property comprising a school, at a school-related activity,
or on, boarding, or departing from any conveyance owned, leased, or
contracted by a school or school district to transport students to or
from school or a school-related activity regardless
of the time of day
183
or time of year that the offense was committed.
The Bill provides comprehensive definitions for "school" and
"school-related activity."' 184 Additionally, courts have upheld a broad
interpretation of "school" as it is defined in the Juvenile Court Act,
indicating that "school" means all parts of a school, such as dorms or
libraries. 185 The definition also includes the non-school property within
1,000 feet of a school. 186 Finally, some judicial language indicates that
aggravated battery with a firearm included any injury, no matter how slight, that his constitutional
rights to due process and proportionate penalties were violated. See id. The court rejected this
argument, stating that the legislature had the authority to affix greater penalties based on protection of the public interest and safety. See id. at 479.
182- See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1998).
183. Act of June 4, 1999, § 405/5-130(a).
184. See id. The definition of "school" as provided by the Act is "a public or private elementary or secondary school, community college, college or university." Id. The definition of
"school related activity" is "any sporting, social, academic or other activity for which students
attendance or participation is sponsored, organized, or funded in whole or in part by a school or
school district." Id.
185. See People v. Goldstein, 562 N.E.2d 1183, 1187 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1990). The
Goldstein decision concerned a juvenile who fell under the 1985 automatic transfer provision
concerning drug and weapons offenses in or within 1,000 feet of a school. See id. at 1184. The
defendant argued that the legislative intent of the statute did not pertain to him, as he was "drawn
onto university property" in order to conduct drug transactions with an undercover police officer.
Id. The language from the automatic transfer statute did not include a definition of "school," so
the court was forced to examine legislative intent. See id. The court concluded that no "meaningful distinction" could be made between a dorm room, a library or the rest of a university, and all
fell within the legislature's intent in passing the transfer law. See id. at 1187.
186. See People v. Owens, 608 N.E.2d 159, 161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1992). Owens concerned an adult who fell under the provisions of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, which
increased the sentence for drug trafficking within 1,000 feet of a school. See id. at 169; see also
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130(3) (West 1998). At trial, the defendant successfully argued the
rule of lenity and since he dealt drugs across the street from Truman College, the legislature did
not intend that the law should apply to him. See Owens, 608 N.E.2d at 160. The rule of lenity is
a common law principle that construes ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the defendant
when legislative history is not available to determine the intent of the drafters of the law. See id.
In rejecting the trial court's argument, the Owens court found that the legislature intended to create safe zones around schools, and that the people in those zones were members of the class the
drafters of the Act sought to protect. See id.at 161. Additionally, the court found that there was
no evidence that the legislature intended to protect rural schools but not city schools. See id. at
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a school need not be completely built to be subject to the new
87
legislation. 1
B. The Legislative Intent
The driving force behind Senate Bill 759, according to its sponsor,
was outrage over the Columbine High School shootings. 188 Supporters
of the Bill in the General Assembly repeatedly cited the general need to
"get tough" on juveniles who fire a weapon on school property, 8 9 while
focusing on the particular instance of the school massacre in Littleton,
Colorado. 19° The sponsor of the Bill also questioned the ability of
162.
187. See People v. Dorris, 638 N.E.2d 279, 281 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1994). Dorris concerned a violation of the 1991 automatic transfer provision concerning drug offenses within 1,000
feet of public housing. See id. at 280; see also 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130(3)(a) (West
1998). The defendants were accused of selling an undercover police officer a gram of crack cocaine at a scattered-site public housing unit that was under construction and unoccupied. See
Dorris, 638 N.E.2d at 280. In finding the defendants guilty, the court analogized the 1,000-foot
provision of the automatic transfer statute to similar provisions in transfer laws concerning
schools. See id. at 281. The court concluded that even though the construction site might contain
people who did not live in public housing, the legislature's purpose of creating a safe zone for
area residents made the statute applicable. See id. Again, the court analogized this principle to
the automatic transfer provisions concerning schools. See id.
188. See Aaron Chambers, Judges Peeved at Sponsor's Comment on Handling of Juveniles,
CHI. DALY L. BULL., May 11, 1999, § 1, at 1. Senator Dillard stated:
I think overwhelmingly that the people of Illinois think that anybody with intent who
opens fire and butchers children or staff in a public school should be treated as an
adult. And I quite frankly do not necessarily trust some judges to deal harshly with a
juvenile who opens fire, who has intent. And I don't think that if you look at a survey
of the people of Illinois that they trust these judges either.
Id.; see also Graham et al., Massacre Shatters School, supra note 7 (describing the Columbine
massacre, which occurred on April 20, 1999, and left 12 students, a teacher and the two gunmen
dead). Although Dillard cited outrage surrounding Littleton as a reason Senate Bill 759 was being proposed, the original proposal date, February 24, 1999, makes this reason impossible. See
Sen. J., 11th Legis. Day 33 (Ill. 1999).
189. See S.B. 759, 44th Legis. Day 2-3 (Ill. 1999) (comments of Rep. J. Turner). Turner rose
to confirm the purpose of Senate Bill 759 from its House sponsor, Representative B. Schmitz:
And I would presume that the purpose for that [Bill] is because if someone 15 years of
age or older, who is still in the juvenile category, were to take a firearm on school
grounds or within a 1000 feet of school grounds, [sic] you want some very meaningful
prosecution, some strict prosecution. And you want to transfer that to the adult
court .... And as I understand it then, this is a 'get tough on crime' Bill. Get tough, in
fact, on juveniles who use guns or take guns on school grounds.
Id.
190. See S.B. 759, 44th Legis. Day 4-5 (Ill. 1999) (comments of Rep. Parke). Parke inquired
if the Bill would have been useful following the shootings in Littleton, Colorado: "Would this...
Bill been able to be applied to the tragedy in Colorado? Would this have a role to play in that
situation if those.., deranged people had not taken their own lives?" Id. Parke concluded by
offering his support for the Bill:
This is an excellent Bill. This is part of the Attorney General's package to try and stem
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Juvenile Court judges to react with the appropriate harshness in
deciding 1 whether to transfer juveniles who fire a gun in a school
setting.

19

The limited opposition to Senate Bill 759 focused on the lack of
necessity for the provision in light of the JJRA, as well as the general
inefficacy of transfer provisions. 1' Opponents in both the Senate and
the House voiced concern that the proposed Bill demonstrated a lack of
confidence in the large overhaul of the Juvenile Court Act conducted in
1998.193 Furthermore, Assembly members raised concerns regarding
the general efficacy of transfer provisions. 194 Supporters of the Bill,
violence with young people. I think this is a tool that is necessary. The majority, the
great majority of us, voted on the House version of this legislation. And I would ask
the Body to continue to support this and put it on the desk of the Governor and let the
Governor sign it, so that we can further use this to protect our society and especially
our children in schools against young people who are ... who have become deranged
and use a weapon as a only means of violence to solve their problems.
Id.
191. See Chambers, supra note 188, at 1.
192. See Senate Roll Call, S.B. 759, 27th Legis. Day (Ill. 1999). The Bill passed the Senate
with 52 yeas, 1 nay, 5 present and 1 not voting. See id.; see also S.B. 759, 44th Legis. Day 8 (Ill.
1999) (comments of Speaker Hartke). Senate Bill 759 passed the House with 95 yeas, 12 nays
and 7 present. See S.B. 759, 44th Legis. Day (Ill. 1999).
193. See S.B. 759, 27th Legis. Day 1-2 (Ill. 1999) (comments of Sen. Obama). Senator
Obama articulated his reasons for not supporting the Bill:
I did just want to point out that last year when we worked-guided so ably by Senator
Hawkinson-on this Bill, the sense was that we had more or less completed an overhaul of the Code and that we were going to pause for a moment, see how that worked
before we moved on. And I guess I'd like to point out that here we are, a year later,
doing the exact same thing that we had been doing prior to the changes we initiated last
year and that is to increase penalties further for juveniles and try them further as adults
and expand the number of offenses. So, for that reason, I'm going to be voting Present.
Id. Representative Currie, in House debate, echoed the concern in stating:
[I]t's not clear to me that this does anything but to further confuse the Juvenile Justice
Reform Act of last year .... We talked about blended sentences in the Juvenile Justice
Reform Act last year. Let's give them a chance to work. That was a solution, perhaps,
to the problem the promoters of this Bill are trying to address. I don't think this Bill
does the job.
S.B. 759, 44th Legis. Day 1-2 (I11.1999).
194. See S.B. 759, 27th Legis. Day 1-2 (Ill. 1999) (comments of Sen. Obama). Senator
Obama questioned why this Bill was before the Senate when a similar proposal had been rejected
a year ago:
Part of the reason that we negotiated it out of that original bill was at least the sense of
some of us that there really is no proof or indication that automatic transfers and increased penalties for juvenile offenses have, in fact, proven to be more effective in reducing juvenile crime or cutting back on recidivism.
Id. Representative Currie expressed similar concerns:
We do know the transfer of juveniles to adult court does not work the way that promoters think it will. They are more likely, children who've been tried in adult court, to
come back out of prison and commit more offenses than youths who are tried in the ju-
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however, dismissed these concerns and garnered overwhelming support
in both Houses of the General Assembly. 195 Accordingly, Governor
196
Ryan signed the Bill into law less than a month later.

IV. ANALYSIS
The passage of Bill 759 in response to the recent disturbing trend of
school shootings marks an inappropriate response to a very serious
problem. First, the new automatic transfer provision represents a
political response to a high-profile, but rare, crisis. 197 Second, the new
legislation suffers from the same faults that plague all automatic transfer
laws.' 9 8 Most notably, this transfer provision will disproportionately
impact urban minorities while seeking to prevent high-profile school
shootings perpetuated almost exclusively by Caucasian suburban
teenagers. 199 Finally, the new legislation contravenes the original
purpose of the Juvenile Court by turning its back on the rehabilitative
ideal and possibly exposing juveniles to the harsh conditions of adult
20 0
prisons.

A.

The Wrong PoliticalResponse to a Serious Problem

The new automatic transfer provision represents an imprudent and
politically-motivated solution to a very serious problem. 20 1 The

venile system.
S.B. 759, 44th Legis. Day 1-2 (Ill. 1999). Currie also noted her concern that automatic transfer
provisions do not guarantee longer sentences for transferred juveniles, and that the Bill would
result in high expenses due to the costs of trying juveniles as adults, and would needlessly clog
criminal courts. See id.
195. See Senate Role Call, S.B. 759, 27th Legis. Day (I11.1999); House Role Call, S.B. 759,
44th Legis. Day (I11. 1999). The Bill passed the General Assembly by a combined total of 147
yeas, 13 nays, 12 present and I not voting.
196. See S.B. 759, 27th Legis. Day 2-3 (Ill. 1999) (comments of Sen. Dillard). Dillard cited a
number of supporters of both the JJRA and Senate Bill 759, including Catherine Ryan, Chief of
the Juvenile Justice Bureau, Cook County State's Attorney's Office, Dick Devine, Cook County
State's Attorney, and Jim Ryan, Illinois Attorney General, in concluding that the Bill's supporters
were "clearly people concerned and attuned with juveniles and their behavior. So this doesn't
come out of thin air." Id.
197. See infra Part IV.A (criticizing the new automatic transfer provision).
198. See infra Part IV.B (stating that the automatic transfer provision for battery with a firearm disregards the peer pressure element of juvenile crime and will fail to deter future crime).
199. See infra Part IV.B (outlining how Illinois' newest automatic transfer provision suffers
from the same shortcomings as other automatic transfer laws).
200. See infra Part IV.C (discussing how the purpose of the newly enacted automatic transfer
provision fails to fulfill the purpose of the original Juvenile Court Act).
201. See Elizabeth Donahoe et al., School House Hype: School Shootings and the Real Risks
Kids Face in America (visited Oct. 8, 1999) <http://www.cjcj.org/jpi/schoolhouse.htm>; Robin
Templeton, First, We Kill All the 11-year-olds (visited Oct. 8, 1999)
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legislature passed the new law due to the rash of high-profile school
2 2
shootings that have rocked America in the last seventeen -months. 0
The logic of the legislature's actions, however, flies in the face of
statistics indicating the low incidence of school violence in America
today. 20 3 The number of Americans killed by lightning every year
actually exceeds the number of children who are killed by gun violence
in schools. 20 4 In the past, other states have resisted the public outcry for
excessively punitive juvenile laws following high-profile crimes but, as
in 1998, the Illinois General Assembly did not.2 °5 Consequently, the
politically-motivated legislation will most likely yield an ineffective
206
law.
This error is all the more glaring in light of the General Assembly's
massive amendments to the Juvenile Court Act less than one year ago
and the existing transfer provisions prior to the passage of the new
law. 2°7 First, the Juvenile Justice Reform Act implemented the largest
overhaul of the Juvenile Court Act in Illinois history, and more
importantly, it has not existed long enough to effectively determine
whether it will be successful. 20 8 The amendments created a new system
<http://www.salon.com/news/1998/05/27news.htm>.
1999) (quoting comments of Representative Parke
202. See S.B. 759, 44th Legis. Day 4-5 (Ill.
during the House floor debate on Senate Bill 759, which became the new automatic transfer law);
see also Chambers, supra note 188, at I (reporting that the sponsor of the legislation, Senator
Kirk Dillard, was outraged and motivated by the school shootings in Littleton, Colorado).
203. See Donahoe et al., supra note 201, at <http://www.cjcj.org/jpi/schoolhouse.htm>.
Eighty-five percent of all American communities reported no juvenile homicides in 1995, and
93.4% recorded one or no juvenile arrests for murder. See id.
204. See id. (citing National Climatic Data Center, 1996 Annual Summaries (1997) (reporting
that 88 people were killed by lightning in 1997)). Forty people (including some adults) were shot
and killed in schools during this same time period. See id. These figures included the highprofile school shootings in Pearl, Mississippi, West Paducah, Kentucky, Springfield, Oregon and
Jonesboro, Arkansas. See id.; see also supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (describing these
school shootings).
205. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text (describing the "blended sentencing" law,
which has been lauded for its fair and balanced approach towards juvenile crime, that Arkansas
implemented following the Jonesboro school shootings); see also Parsons, supra note 100, at 10
(detailing the high-profile crimes which spurred the Illinois General Assembly into passing the
Juvenile Justice Reform Act in 1998); The Right Result For The Wrong Reason, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
1, 1999, § 1, at 20 (calling the General Assembly's decision to build a maximum security prison
for juveniles "a testament to the folly of basing public policy on politically motivated panicpeddling").
206. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the general inefficacy of automatic transfer provisions in
deterring juvenile crime).
207. See supra Part II.B (discussing the 1998 amendments to the Juvenile Court Act, which
constituted the largest overhaul of the Act in Juvenile Court history); supra Part II.A.2-3 (chronicling the history and extent of automatic transfer provisions in Illinois before the current legislation).
208. See Juvenile Justice Reform Provisions of 1998, Pub. Act No. 90-590, 1998 Il.Laws
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of trying and rehabilitating juvenile offenders, while purposely

excluding a proposed aggravated battery with a firearm transfer
provision. 209 A centerpiece of the JJRA was "blended sentencing,"
which allows a Juvenile Court judge to impose a criminal sentence on
210
top of a juvenile sentence if the youth violates that juvenile sentence.

In instances where a minor was charged with aggravated battery with a
firearm, Juvenile Court judges could demonstrate the seriousness of the
minor's offense by imposing a severe adult sentence, while at the same
time allowing for the possibility of rehabilitation by insuring that the
services of the Juvenile Court were at the child's disposal.2 11 Marketed
as a final incentive for juveniles to change their ways, the possible
benefits of blended sentencing cannot be properly evaluated in light of
2 12
the new transfer provision.
Second, existing transfer provisions adequately insured that the
school violence the General Assembly sought to punish would be dealt
with in criminal court.2 13 Prior to the passage of the new legislation,
2 14
aggravated battery with a firearm was a presumptive transfer offense.
It placed the burden of proof on the accused minor to demonstrate that
he or she should be tried in Juvenile Court.2 15 Data from this time
period indicated that, while prosecutors had been successful in
transferring juveniles charged with this offense to criminal court, in
over half the cases prosecutors did not have enough evidence to file a
petition requesting transfer. 2 16 Under the new automatic transfer
provision, a lack of evidence will not be a bar to transfer. 2 17 While
1035-1281 (West); Jochner, supra note 97, at 152.
209. See supra notes 98, 99, 102 and accompanying text (describing the BARJ model of juvenile delinquency, which the Juvenile Court adopted in 1998, and discussing the rejection of an
aggravated battery with a firearm transfer provision as a part of that legislation).
210. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text (explaining "blended sentencing," as
promulgated by the Illinois General Assembly).
211. See Drizin, supra note 29, at 1; Letter from James R. Covington II, Director of Legislative Affairs, Illinois State Bar Association, to Governor George Ryan, Governor of the State of
Illinois 1 (May 20, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter "Covington Letter"].
212. See Covington Letter, supra note 211, at 2.
213. See Drizin, supra note 29, at 1.
214. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(2) (1998) (defining presumptive transfer); see also
supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (chronicling the history of presumptive transfer and
explaining its usage).
215. See § 405/5-805(2).
216. See supra note 91 (containing the full breakdown of statistical data for aggravated battery
with a firearm presumptive transfers in March, 1998, and indicating that in 42 of the 79 cases,
prosecutors did not have enough information to file a petition for transfer to criminal court).
217. See Act of June 4, 1999, Pub. Act No. 91-15, sec. 5, § 405/5-805(1), 1999 111.Legis.
Serv. 125, 130-31 (West) (to be codified in 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(l)(d)) (defining
automatic transfer and explaining that a minor who is automatically transferred to criminal court
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existing transfer provisions ensured that school violence would not go
unpunished, the new transfer provision only guarantees that the JJRA
will go unevaluated.21 8
B.

The General Inefficacy of Automatic Transfer Provisions

In addition to ignoring the Juvenile Court's rehabilitative purpose, the
automatic aggravated battery with a firearm transfer provision suffers
from the same shortcomings exhaustively detailed in empirical studies

on other automatic transfer laws. 2 19 Perhaps most importantly, transfer
provisions evoke a disproportionate impact on urban minorities. 220 The
legislative intent behind the new aggravated battery with a firearm
transfer provision involved the prevention of school violence, namely
the high-profile school shootings that have plagued America in the last
seventeen months. 22 1 Caucasian children in a suburban environment, a
group not historically impacted by automatic transfer provisions,
however, committed all of the shootings. 222 In the last seventeen
months, seven Caucasian children and teenagers residing in rural or
suburban towns have killed twenty-two of their Caucasian classmates
and two of their Caucasian teachers. 223 None of the gunmen, and only
one of the victims, was a minority. 224 While researchers argue over the
overall disproportionate effect transfer provisions have on minorities,
research on children in Cook County convincingly demonstrates the

is done so based only on his or her age at the time of the statutory offense charged by the prosecutor).
218. See Drizin, supra note 29, at 1.
219. See Covington Letter, supra note 211, at 1.
220. See Clarke, supra note 50, at 11-12 (summarizing Illinois transfer studies on the disproportionate effect on minority youth); Kane, supra note 152, at 18-19.
221. See S.B. 759, 44th Legis. Day 5 (Ill. 1999) (comments of Rep. Parke). Representative
Parke asked the legislature:
[T]o continue to support this and put it on the desk of the Governor and let the Governor sign it, so that we can further use this to protect our society and especially our children in schools against young people who are.., who have become deranged and use
a weapon as a only means of violence to solve their problems.
Id.
222. See Jill Nelson, White Lies (visited Oct. 7, 1999) <www.salon.com
news/features/1999/05/04/lies/indexlhtml> (discussing the role of race in the post-Columbine
news coverage, and noting that the gunmen in all recent high-profile school shootings have been
white); see also Clarke, supra note 50, at 11-12 (showing that urban minorities are subjected
more often to automatic transfer laws than their Caucasian suburban counterparts).
223. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (describing the school shootings in Pearl,
Mississippi, West Paducah, Kentucky, Jonesboro, Arkansas, Springfield, Oregon and Littleton,
Colorado).
224. See Nelson, supra note 222 (identifying the single minority victim as Columbine High
School senior Isaiah Shoels).
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biased effect of transfer provisions. 225 Accordingly, the primary effect
of the new legislation in Illinois will most likely be on Chicago area
minority children, who will be unfairly and disproportionately impacted
226
by a law that was not intended to impact them.
Also, automatic transfer provisions disregard the peer pressure
element of juvenile crime and treat all juveniles identically. 227 Using
accountability provisions, prosecutors are able to insure that a group of
228
juveniles involved in a shooting will all be tried in criminal court.
The minor who did not know his friend was carrying a weapon will be
treated the same as the shooter.229 Studies demonstrate that
overwhelming amounts of juveniles commit crimes in groups and act
under the influence of peer pressure. 230 Nonetheless, automatic transfer
23 1
provisions disregard this important characteristic of juvenile crime.
Finally, transfer provisions do not deter future juvenile crime as they
232
may also lead to higher rates of recidivism among transferred minors.
Empirical data resoundingly shows that automatic transfer provisions do
not lead to a decrease in the juvenile crime they are expressly designed
to prevent.2 33 In some instances, the crime rate actually increases.2 3
Furthermore, recidivism rates for transferred minors are consistently
235
higher than those of their counterparts who appear in Juvenile Court.
According to empirical studies on recidivism, the new legislation will
most likely fail to lower the rate of school violence, while most likely
increasing the recidivism rate of juvenile offenders who are punished
236
under the new law.

225. See Clarke, supra note 50, at 4; Kane, supra note 152, at 18.
226. See Clarke, supra note 50, at 11-12; see also supra note 190 (discussing the prevention
of recent school shootings like the massacre in Littleton, Colorado as the motivating force behind
the new legislation).
227. See Drizin, supra note 29, at 1.
228. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-2 (1998); Covington Letter, supra note 211, at 2.
229. See Covington Letter, supra note 211, at 2.
230. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text (discussing the role of peer pressure in
juvenile crime).
231. See Zimring, supra note 116, at 867; see also supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text
(describing empirical studies on juveniles and group crime).
232. See Myers, supra note 108, at <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapterl_.2.htn>.
233. See Jensen & Metsger, supra note 120, at 98-99; Singer & McDowell, supra note 122, at
522; Myers, supra note 108, at <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapterl_2.htn>.
234. See Singer & McDowell, supra note 122, at 532-33.
235. See Bishop et al., supra note 166, at 171; Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 146, at 490-91;
Myers, supra note 108, at <http://www.preventingcrime.org/r2/chapterl_2.htm>.
236. See Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 146, at 491.
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C. The ForgottenPurpose of Juvenile Court
The Illinois General Assembly's decision to add aggravated battery
with a firearm to the list of automatic transfer offenses contravenes the
original intent of the founders of the Juvenile Court by rejecting the
237
rehabilitative ideal and possibly relegating juveniles to adult prisons.
The original Juvenile Court Act changed the focus of the legal system
from punishment to rehabilitation and sought to prevent
juveniles from
238
being exposed to the harsh conditions of adult prisons.
The new automatic transfer provision turns its back on the
rehabilitative ideal. 239 Regardless of each juvenile's individual
involvement in the crime and other particular circumstances of their
case, transfer laws arbitrarily send all minors to criminal court based
solely on their age and the crime with which they are charged.2 4° Both
successful "graduates" of Juvenile Court, as well as the mainstream
media, criticized these4 1laws as completely contrary to the original goals
2
of the Juvenile Court.
Additionally, transfer provisions expose juveniles to the harsh
conditions of adult prisons, a situation that sparked the passage of the
first Juvenile Court Act one hundred years ago. 242 Today's prisons are
every bit as dangerous to today's juveniles as they were to those one

237. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text (defining the intent of the founders of Juvenile Court).
238. See Mack, supra note 30, at 107 (discussing the rehabilitative ideal of Juvenile Court);
Bowen, supra note 29, at 449-53 (detailing the "many pitiful cases" of juveniles confined in Illinois prisons).
239. See Drizin, supra note 29, at 1.
240. See id.
241. A recently released book profiles the stories of "graduates" of the Juvenile Court system-children who for various reasons found themselves in trouble with the law at an early age,
yet managed to have profound success as adults in various fields. See Bob Beamon, Second
Chances: Locking up Kids Robs Them of Their Future-andRobs the Future of Them, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 2, 1999, § 1, at 31 (describing the juvenile court experiences of Bob Beamon, a former gang
member who was spared from adult prison by a Juvenile Court judge, and later went on to win a
gold medal in the Olympics and shatter the world long jump record); Bernadine Dor & Steven
A. Drizin, A Second Chance: Juvenile Delinquents Who Transformed Themselves and History,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 4, 1999, § 1, at 15 (relating the successful life stories of former delinquents
turned baseball hall-of-famers Babe Ruth and Satchel Paige and former delinquent-turned-singer
Ella Fitzgerald); Terrence Hallinan, Juveniles Deserve a Second Chance, USA TODAY, Aug. 25,
1999, at 13A (describing the life experiences of Terrence Hallinan, who was banished from his
home county by a Juvenile Court judge and went on to become District Attorney of San Francisco); You Can't Legislate Adulthood, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1999, § 1, at 30 (arguing that the
proposed aggravated battery with a firearm automatic transfer provision "flies in the face" of the
reasoning that led to the establishment of the Juvenile Court).
242. See supra note 29 (describing the harsh conditions of adult prisons in Chicago at the turn
of the century, a condition which motivated the passage of the first Juvenile Court Act).
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hundred years ago. 24 3 Juveniles are almost eight times more likely to
commit suicide in adult prisons than their counterparts in juvenile
detention facilities. 244 They are five times more likely to be sexually
assaulted by fellow inmates and two times more likely to be physically
assaulted by prison employees. 245 Although current Illinois law
mandates that juveniles and adult inmates remain separated, pending
federal legislation would expose all automatically transferred to these
debilitating conditions. 246 By transferring juveniles to criminal court,
the new legislation not only decreases the likelihood of a child's future
success, but increases the chances of violence against the juvenile
247
incarcerated in an adult prison.
V.

PROPOSAL

Until the efficacy of automatic transfer provisions is established, the
Illinois General Assembly should repeal the current aggravated battery
with a firearm transfer law and reinstate the discretion to transfer a
juvenile accused of this crime to criminal court to the Juvenile Court
judge. Currently, Juvenile Court judges do not hesitate to transfer
serious cases of aggravated battery with a firearm to criminal court, and
they are also better equipped to react to the differing circumstances of
each juvenile's case. 248 Furthermore, the repeal of the new transfer
provision would demonstrate confidence in the JJRA of 1998 and allow
a more complete analysis of the effectiveness of those massive
243. See HOWELL, supra note 108, at 109; Jason Ziedenberg & Vincent Schiraldi, The Risks
Juveniles Face When They Are Incarcerated With Adults (last visited Oct. 7, 1999)
<http://www.cjcj.org/jpi/risks.htm>.
244. See Ziedenberg & Schiraldi, supra note 243 (finding that the suicide rate of juveniles
detained in adult prisons was 7.7 times the suicide rate of juveniles in juvenile detention centers
and that the suicide rate of juveniles in juvenile detention centers was lower than the suicide rate
of the general population).
245. See id. The study reported that five times as many juveniles held in adult prisons responded affirmatively to the question "has anyone attempted to sexually attack or rape you?" than
minors held in juvenile detention centers. Id. Due to the typically diminutive size of most juvenile offenders, "[tihey will become somebody's 'girlfriend' very, very fast." Id.
246. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-10-7 (1998). Juveniles and adults are separated until the
juvenile turns twenty-one. See id. The Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, however, may transfer a juvenile over the age of seventeen to adult prison if "the interests of safety,
security and discipline" require it. Id; see also Ziedenberg & Schiraldi, supra note 243, at
<http://www.cjcj.org/jpi/risks.htm> (discussing the proposed juvenile justice legislation, which
proposes to withhold federal funds from states unless they transfer large numbers of juvenile offenders to adult prisons).
247. See Ziedenberg & Schiraldi, supra note 243, at <http://www.cjcj.org/jpi/risks.htm>.
248. See supra note 91 (containing the full breakdown of statistical data for aggravated battery
with a firearm presumptive transfers in March, 1998, and indicating that in 11 of the 79 cases,
judges transferred juveniles to criminal court).
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amendments. 249 Finally, although the General Assembly should react
quickly and decisively to violent crimes such as school shootings, they
should not be so eager to turn their back on the original rehabilitative
ideal of the Juvenile Court.25 0 Rather, they should follow the lead of
states like Arkansas, which allow Juvenile Court judges to determine
the fate of juvenile delinquents in a system similar to the JJRA passed
by the Illinois General Assembly. 25 1 Although juveniles who enter
classrooms with guns blazing deserve to be punished to the full extent
of the law, automatic transfer provisions unfairly punish thousands of
less culpable children. Therefore, such provisions should be rejected.2 52
VI.

CONCLUSION

The passage of the new aggravated battery with a firearm automatic
transfer provision represents a politically-motivated wrong answer to
the serious question of how to deal with the high-profile school
shootings of the past seventeen months. Moreover, current studies
demonstrate that automatic transfer provisions generally do not deter
juvenile crime; rather, they disproportionately impact urban minorities
and lead to higher rates of recidivism for punished minors. Finally, the
new legislation contravenes the original intent of the founders of the
Juvenile Court. The transfer provision turns its back on the
rehabilitative ideal and may expose juveniles to the harsh conditions of
adult prisons. The Illinois General Assembly should repeal this new
law and reinvest Juvenile Court judges with the discretion to transfer
violent offenders like school shooters to criminal court. This would
demonstrate confidence in the JJRA of 1998, which constituted the
largest overhaul of the Juvenile Court Act in its one hundred year
history, and stress juveniles' accountability for their crimes. More
importantly, however, the repeal of the aggravated battery with a
firearm transfer provision would allow Juvenile Court judges to punish
children who intended to shoot their classmates as adults, without
restricting Juvenile Court judges' ability to help rehabilitate a child who
was in the wrong place at the wrong time.
DANIEL E. TRAVER
249. See Drizin, supra note 29, at 1; Covington Letter, supra note 211, at 2.
250. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (discussing the intent of the founders of
the Juvenile Court).
251. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text (describing the blended sentencing law,
which has been praised for its fair and balanced approach towards juvenile crime, that Arkansas
implemented following the Jonesboro school shootings).
252. See Drizin, supra note 29, at 1 (describing how less culpable offenders are sent to criminal court using automatic transfer provisions).

